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A number of competent philosophers have put forth 
the view that the inotacthical problem of the justifi-
cation of morality is merely a pseudo-problem. To 
"justify morality," on the standard treatment, is to 
provide an answer to the question, "Why should 1 he 
moral?" or to some other question very like it; but, 
it is claimed, this is an illegitimate, meaningless 
or circular question: it is impossible in principle 
to answer it and (hence) also unnecessary! "There 
can he no answer to an illegitimate question, save 
that the question is illegitimate."1 
According to U.A. Prichsrd, for example, to ask 
"Why should I be moral?" is to ask for a proof of 
morality, a proof of "the truth of what...wo have 
prior to reflection believed immediately or without 
proof." 2 Prichard disposes of the problem by taking 
an intuitionist tack: it is neither possible nor 
necessary to give a proof of morality, because the 
truth or untruth of moral claims is self-evident and 
"immediately" perceived or intuited. "The sense of 
obligation to do, or of the rightness of, nn action 
of a particular kind is absolutely underivntivc or 
immediate...We do not come to appreciate an obliga-
tion by an argument, i.e., by a process of non-moral 
thinking."3 Toulmin, on the otheT hand, says of the 
question "Why ought one to do what is right?" that 
There is no room within ethics for such a 
question...It is a self-contradiction (taking 
'right' and 'ought' in their simplest senses) 
to suggest that we 'ought' to do anything but 
what is 'right.1 This suggestion is as un-
intelligible as the suggestion that some 
emerald objects might not be green...We can 
thcrofore only parry it with another question 
•What else "ought" one to do?' 4 
Thus, if we think that we must somehow "justify" ethics, 
we put before ourselves tho task of answering a 
literally meaningless question; far to ask "Why ought 
we to do what is right?" is like asking "Why ought wo 
to do what we ought to dp?" Toulmin calls such 
questions "limiting questions" --by which he means 
that they are illegitimate extrapolations of a kind of 
question which is meaningfuT in certain contexts, 
fuicstions of the Torrn "Why ought we to do x?»* make 
perfectly good sense when wo arc inquiring about 
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alternative courses of action -- e.g., "Why ought wc 
to nay our hills?" It is just becnuso such questions 
do make senso in contexts like these that we come to 
think they will still make sense when applied beyond 
their proper contexts "Why ought wc to do what is 
right?." "Why should I be moral?." etc And Prichnrd 
is making somewhrt the same sort of point when he 
compares the asking of the latter question to a 
"parallel mistake" which, in his view, underlies the 
theory of knowledge. 
...At some time in the history of all of us. if 
we arc thoughtful, the frequency of our own and 
of other's mistakes is hound to lead to the 
reflection that possibly we and others have 
always been mistaken in consequence of some 
radical defect in our faculties.5 
Now, Prichard is right in saying that the doubts 
raised by Descartes "could, if genuine, never be sot 
at rest"; 0 but his conclusion, that we must come to 
"realize the inevitable immediacy of knowledge"' and 
dispense entirely with epistopological inquiry, is 
grotesque. Still, it would seem possible for "limiting 
questions" to be asked in cpistcmology -- e.g., of an 
empirical scientist by a Berkeleyan idealist -- and 
there would seem to be an analogy between such 
questions and "Why should wo be moral?" Even Kurt 
Baior, who finds this last question to be meaningful 
(when translated as "Why should wc let our moral 
reasons take precedence over others?") still finds a 
"limiting" question at the very roots of the problem 
of the justification of morals: Why should wc follow 
reason? 
...the question 'shall (should, ought) I follow 
reason?' must be paraphrased as 'I wish to do what 
is supported by the best reasons. Tell me 
whether doinp what is supported by the best 
reasons is doing what is supported by the best 
reasons. 1 8 
From these and other selections, 1 feel safe in 
inferring that it is a common feature of most treat-
ments of the prohlom of moral-justification (whether 
the author believes it to be a pseudo-problern or not) 
that this problem has boon tied to some such question 
us "why should I be moral?" And there is indeed 
something very odd about those questions --an oddncss 
best exhibited in the Toulmin version: "Why ought 
we to do what is right?" The oddncss of the nucst.ion 
is not wholly brought out by showing that it can be 
paraphrased in such a way ns to make it circular: 
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what is more important, the question clearly seems to 
presuppose that there is something that is right — 
that there really are right acts and yet still 
asks whether we ought to do them. Toulmin is quite 
correct in pointing out that this question is 
circular -- if there really are right acts, it follows 
analytically that we ought to do them; hut it is 
passing strange that he should construe the problem 
of moral-justification as the problem of finding nn 
answer to this question. "Why should we be moral?" 
is similar in character: we are not denied the 
presupposition that there ore certain lines of 
conduct which really are "moral," but we arc still 
asked whether we should pursue these lines of conduct. 
All such questions Toulmin's "limiting" questions 
about morals -*> share this feature in common: that 
they presuppose, or allow us to presuppose, the 
truth of moral claims about the rightness of actions 
or the goodness of ends, and yet ask the (hence 
foolish) question whether we ought to follow the 
courses of action which, if our afore-mentioned 
presupposition were correct, we consequently ought 
to follow. 
The philosophers who have tackled the problem 
of moral-justification have, it seems, invariably 
been men who themselves subscribed to the "moral 
point of view" — invariably, they find cither that 
the problem is soluble and that ethics can be 
justified, or that the problem is a psuedo-prohlcm 
and that ethics requires no justification; further-
more, they write for an audience which (they can 
presume) is similarly disposed toward the fate of 
ethics. The result is rather like watching an early 
Christian zealot try to do apologetic theology for 
the benefit of his fellow early Christinns. Since 
questions like "Why should we be moral?" do not 
really challenge the truth of the fundamental moral 
claims, and consequently give one only the dimmest 
and most confused of insights into the problem that 
we are really trying to get at when we speak of 
"justifying" morals, it is no wonder that moral-
justification has never really become a live questioa, 
and that one eventually comes to 
...feel a vague sense of dissatisfaction with 
tho whole subject (of Moral Philosophy]...'What 
are books on Moral Philosophy Tcally trying to 
show, and when their aim is clear, xthy arc they 
so unconvincing and artificial?'9 
tt is Toulmin who quite inadvertently gets to 
the very heart of the matter when ha says this: 
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Ethics may be supposed to '•justify* one of a 
number of courses of action, or one social 
practice as opposed to another; but it does 
not extend to the 'justification* of all 
reasoning about conduct* One course of action 
mar be opposed to another; one social practice 
may be opposed to another. But to what arc we 
expected to oppose ethics-as-aewhole?1" 
Now, this is really the central question that must be 
answered before wo can properly lay out the problem 
of moral justification; in order to make sense of the 
problem we must he able to conceive of some real 
alternative to the moral point of view. Typically, 
whenever such an "alternative" has been offered, it 
has been merely self-interest. The demand for a 
justification of morals, says Prichnrd, first arises 
from the conflict between self-interest and morals; 
and the limiting question has sometimes been asked 
this way: "why should I do what is right when it is 
against my self-interest to do so?" Again, it is 
Toulmin who gives the best coup de grace to this way 
of thinking: 
...If those who call for a 'justification' of 
ethics want 'the case for morality' as opposed 
to 'the case for expediency,' etc., then they 
are giving philosophy a job which is not its own. 
To show that you ought to choose certain actions 
is one thing; to make you want to do what you 
ought to do is another, and riot a philosopher's 
task,'I 
Obviously, what we have in mind when we speak of 
"justifying" morals is neither (1) the task of convin-
cing you that you ought to choose this or that action 
over its alternatives, nor (2) the task of making you 
want to do what you ought to do. But these two 
alternatives arc, after all, not necessarily exhaus-
tive. There is a third alternative -- for in order to 
convince you that you ought to perform this or that 
action, vc must apply certain criteria to distinguish 
the acts we ought to do from those wc ought not to 
do. Ko must apply these criteria, and this gives 
us another task: that of showing that the criteria 
we apply arc in truth the correct criteria -- or, 
failing that, that at least there are such correct 
criteria (though they may not hove previously been 
ours) for evaluating actions as good or bad. To 
do this would be to show that some acts really arc 
good, and that othors really arc bad; th'is iVtlio 
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sort of enterprise that we actually have in mind when 
vre speak of "justifying" ethics. In this context, tho 
proper alternative to the moral point of view is not 
the private'policy (as Kai Nelson would say) of self-
interest, but the counter-doctrine of philosophical 
nihilism. The question we really should be asking 
is not "Why ought we to do what is right?" but "Ought 
we to do anything?" 
Philosophical nihilism may be characterized simply 
as the view that reality is morally neutral. Unlike 
omotivism, it does not hold that moral statements arc 
meaningless, non-cognitive, incapable of being cither 
true or false, etc.; rather, nihilism insists that 
moral statements must be meaningful, must express 
propositions, but that these propositions are (also) 
all false* This is possible because the denial that 
x is good does not entail the assertion that x is 
bad, nor vice versa; a state of ethical neutrality 
may be envisioned, such that acts are neither right 
nor wrong, and ends or consequences are neither good 
nor bad. It is, in othors words, logically possible 
for all positive ethical assertions ("x is good," 
"y is bad," "a is right," etc.) to be false. Of 
course, when we deny the proposition "This act is 
right" we arc affirming the proposition "This act is 
not right"; and within the hounds of the moral point 
of view, when people say that something is not right, 
they usually mean that it is wrong. However, I must 
emphasize that this only happens within the ethical 
framework, where the expression "This is not right" 
has come to be a cautious way of condemning. Likewise, 
on the opposite usage, when we deny "This act is 
wrong," we affirm "This act is not wrong"; when people 
say that something is not wrong, they typically mean 
that it is morcly "all right" (i.e., morally permissible) 
rather than right (i.e., obligatory). It would, I 
think, be a very great mistake to conclude here that 
the expression "This act is not right" has two 
senses, one moral and one non-moral or extra-moral 
i.e., that the contradictories of positive moral 
assertions have a different meaning when used outside 
the context of the moral point of view than they have 
when used within that context. We arc speaking here 
of the sense of sentences which is to say, we arc 
spoaking of the propositions that sentences'express; 
and I am sure wc would not want to say that the 
nihilist expresses a different proposition by "This act 
is not right" than tho othicist docs. After all, vre 
would not want to say that the sentence "This act is 
right" expresses different propositions for the 
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nihilist and the ethicist respectively, for we want 
the nihilist to be able to deny the sane proposition 
that the ethicist affirms -- the nihilist holding that 
it is always false, while the ethicist contends that 
it is sometimes true. Rather, what we should say is 
this: that the contradictories of positive moral 
assertions, when used within the framework of the 
moral point of view, tend to convey an additional 
message that they do not convey when used oujtsidc that 
framework. For when within the ethical framework,- wc 
claim that such-and-such an act is not right, wc have 
gone a long way toward claiming that it is wrong; 
because there arc very few possibilities, and wo shall 
have eliminated at least one of them. The moral point 
of view involves the presupposition that every 
conceivable human action is either obligatory, per-
missible or impermissible, and when within the frame-
work of this point of vicv? we say that a given act is 
"not right" or "not wrong," wc have eliminated at least 
one (and often, in the former case, two) of these 
alternatives. Wc are accustomed to thinking within 
this framework; thus, it may seem to us that if a man 
asserts the truth of propositions like "This act is 
not wrong," he has thereby committed himself to the 
moral point of view for in granting that some 
particular act is not wrong, one seems implicitly 
to be recognizing that some actions are wrong. But 
this is an illusion, which persists only as long as 
we focus upon the atomic propositions ("x is not right,•« 
"x is not wrong," "y is not right," "y is not wrong") 
which the nihilist (in order to be consistent) must 
affirm; it is the logical crux of nihilism that all 
possible, actions arc neither right nor wrong. It 
would logically follow from this "first premiss" of 
nihilism that an infinite host of "atomic" proposi-
tions (about particular actions) are false -- namely, 
all positive moral assertions; and owing to tho intimate 
logical relations between a proposition and its 
contradictory, it would follow that another host of 
atomic propositions would be true -- namely, the 
contradictories, of all positive moral assertions. But 
the nihilist is not ordinarily concerned with affirming 
the truth of individual atomic propositions of the 
latter sort, as it would tend to bo not only point-
less but oven somewhat misleading for him to do so --
what is important is that they arc all true, and that 
the positivo moral assertions of which they arc the 
contradictories arc all false. (The same can of course 
be said about the positive moral assertions of the 
"goodnoss" or "badness" of the consequences of acts.) 
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Not*, on tho moral point of view, as I have said, 
every possible action must be either impermissible, 
permissible, or obligatory; and it mny seem that what 
I have done in the foregoing account of the logical 
nature of nihilism is merely to extend the category 
of permissibility, so as to take in all possible 
actions: "All is permitted," would thus be the 
nihilist slogan par excellence. And it is true, in 
an odd sense, that this is what the nihilist 
maintains that all is permitted, i.e., that nothing 
is forbidden; but it is a very odd sense indeed, since 
it is tho nihilist's view that there is nothing or no 
one to do the permitting. The idea of "permissibility" 
has little meaning if there are not some acts that 
are impermissible; and to say that all acts arc 
"permissible" is entirely too much like saying that 
all possible actions have the sanction of some rather 
bizarre moral doctrine. Thus, it is"not really 
proper nTTuTlsra to say "All is permitted"; nothing has 
to be pormitted. If a nihilist occasionally'does have 
to resort to the expression "All is permitted" in 
order to got his point across, we may perhaps regard 
this as a metaphorical use of the word ."permissible." 
llut I digress; the important point to be grasped 
in the foregoing is that there is no logical 
impassibility about the doctrine of nihilism -- it 
is logically possible for all positive moral 
assertions to be false. In order for those assertions 
to be false, they must be meaningful. And this is 
another important point about the doctrine of 
nihilism: it holds morality to be a delusion, but a 
cognitive delusion. Thus, curiously enough, the 
doctrine of nihilism at certain crucial points is in 
agreement with the moral point of view; the nihilist 
takes as his point of departure the same raetaethical 
doctrines that the sounder sort of moral theories 
presuppose. Morality is cognitive that is to say, 
moral statements ore meaningful, they express 
propositions which must be cither true or false and 
which give one information about something. Hut if 
these statements are cognitive, how do we 
cognizo them? And what aro they about? 
Kmotlvism and subjectivism often seem like covert 
forms of nihilism. Umotivism is, as we have seen, 
the view that moral statements arc literally meaning-
less, that they are not really statements at all but 
mere expressions of our attitudes of approval or 
disapproval;, subjectivism, a near cousin, holds that 
moral statements are meaningful, but that they are 
merely statements about our attitudes of approval 
or disapproval. But the nihilist is no more a 
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subjectivist than he is an cmotivist; he would be the 
first to admit that moral -statements purport to be 
about something besides merely our attitudes toward 
the things we commend or condemn. And most moralists 
would. I think, bo in agreement here: the truth 
value of "John did wrong in shooting Helena" is not 
the same as the truth-value of "1 disapprove of John's 
shooting of Helena." If I say 'Mohn did wrong in 
shooting Helena," I am not talking merely about my 
own or anyone elses disapproval of John's shooting 
of Helena. But what, then,am I talking about? Well, 
to begin with, the proposition "John was wrong in 
shooting Helena" is about John, and Helena, and 
John's act of shooting Helena; but it is also about 
something else. Now, it has been presupposed that 
moral statements, being meaningful, must be either 
true or false; and I trust that roost of us (at least 
in our unphilosophicnl moments) subscribe to the 
correspondence theory of truth. It is a necessary 
condition for the truth of the proposition "John did 
wrong in shooting Helena" that there is a John, and 
that there is (or was) a Helena, and that the former 
did In fact shoot the latter; but tho sufficient 
condition for the truth of "John did wrong in shooting 
Helena" is that the shooting of Helena was wrong. This 
"wrongness" is a radically different kind of entity 
from the others mentioned, and one about which wc arc 
entitled to have some doubts; it is neither an 
empirical predicate nor a physical entity. If this 
were an actual case, instead of an hypothetical one, 
those of us who had known John and Helena would 
surely entertain no doubts as to their respective 
existences,having been in their presence a number 
of times; Bcrkclcynn idealism, sensc-dnta theory, 
and skepticism about other minds arc really very 
little help In '.convincing us that our own acquaintances 
do not exist, e»cn should we want to -- in their 
presence, wc would hardly think of viewing what we 
wore seeing and hearing as logical constructions out 
of sense-data, or as automatons, or indeed as anything 
but tho corporeal bodies of living persons. Likewise, 
if apprised of the ugly fact by a suitably reliable 
informant, wc would have little doubt that John 
actually had shot Helena, or at least that Helena 
had been shot b* someone; and wc would have no doubt 
that, had wc been present at the scene of the shooting, 
in a privileged position and undetected, wc could 
have empirically ascertained what actually took place, 
and in such a way as to givo conclusive evidence at 
the trial. Wc would be able to sec who the 
assailant was, what kind of gun was used, bow many 
shots were fired, etc; we might even be able to 
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ascertain empirically whether the act ivas intontional 
or inadvertent, whether it was premeditated, and 
whether it took the victim by surprise.* One thing 
we would definitely not have been able to perceive or 
ascertain cmprically, however, would he the wrongncss 
of the act. 
Let me make myself clearer here. If wc were to 
hear that John had shot Helena, and that John was being 
held on suspicion of murder, we would probably think 
that John was guilty of wrongdoing; hut if it 
subsequently came out at the trial that John had shot 
Helena inadvertently, or in self-defense, wc would 
abruptly change our opinion. There are a number of 
such considerations, which in our actual moral 
practice could cither extenuate or confirm the 
presumed moral guilt of persons who commit acts like 
John's: whether the act was intentional or inadver-
tent; whether it was deliberate and premeditated or 
committed in a moment of passion; whether it was done 
for personal gain or as a mercy-killing; and so on. 
All of these things are empirically ascertainable in 
principle -- at least to the satisfaction of a judge 
and jury -- and if our hypothetical watcher-from-
thc-shadows were to appear at the trial and give 
evidence that John had loaded the gun forty-five 
minutes before the shooting and secreted it in tho 
room where the shooting was to take place (indicating 
premeditation) wc would, in the absence of any 
extenuating, circumstances, have our opinion as to 
the wrongncss of John's act confirmed. Yet all our 
hypothetical witness has empirically ascertained is, 
that the act was premeditated; he has not empirically 
ascertained that the act was wrong. Such features 
of an act as are empirically ascertainable 1 shall 
call the '^-predicates" of the act; such features as 
an act is alleged to have, but the presence or absence 
of which cannot be empirically ascertained, I shall 
call "M-predicatcs." One who wanted to maintain 
the essential privacy of mental states tnipht want 
to quibble with roy calling intentions, premeditation, 
etc., "empirically ascertainable" since these are 
mental states -- "You can never really know ifhat I 
intend to do," etc. However, ! cannot doubt the 
existence of mental states in the way that I can 
doubt tho existence of Hod and ghosts or the truth 
of moral assertions, r am too sure of my awn mental 
states to doubt the existence of this kind of entity; 
and although one can always he mistaken"in imputing 
such states to other people, I do not think this is 
terribly important. There is a hierarchy among 
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skepticisms. Kith different levels of unlikelihood: 
it is more plausible to doubt the existence of other 
minds than to doubt the existence of the external 
world; and by the same token, it is more plausible 
to doubt the*existence of Hod than the existence of 
other minds. 'Ihe nihilist and the atheist doubt only 
what thoy cannot sec; the Berkclcyan idealist 
contrives to dcubt the existence of what he can see. 
Thus I shall slick with my taxonomy of H-prcdicatcs 
and M-prcdicntcs of acts; ethics, if it is to meet 
the nihilist challenge, must show how these two sorts 
of predicates arc connected. Obviously, the connection 
cannot be verified empirically. Intuition]sm, it is 
clear, is an attempt to supply this connection from 
a source that is technically non-empirical, but 
strangely reminiscent of empirical verification, as 
the term "moral sense" would seem to show. According 
to the intuiticnist, the wrongncss of nn act or kind 
of act is self-evident, and is presented to us through 
intnition --a burst of insight or Tcvelation which 
comes to us when we carefully consider the act. Now, 
an intuition, really, is a kind of experience --to 
be painfully blunt, a feeling -- and apparently the 
only thing that, entitles us to call tho resulting 
cognitions a priori instead of a posteriori is that 
moral intuitions belong to emotional or mystical 
experience rather than sense-experience. The 
intuitionist doctrine is convincing only if we think 
we recognize such mystical experiences in ourselves; 
if wo are so convinced, we will likely be impervious 
to the nihilist assault --if the truth of moral 
claims is "intuitive and immediate/' then (as Prichard 
would say) it is neither possible nor necessary to 
give a "proof" of morality. However, CiT. Moore, 
himself an iutuitionist, had something very damaging 
to say about this last claim: 
Still less do I imply (as most intuitionists have 
done) that any proposition whatever is true 
because we cognize it in a particular'way or by 
the exercise of a particular faculty: I hold, 
on the contrary, that in every way in which 
it is possible to cognize a true proposition, 
it is also possible to cognize a false one. 1 2 
Furthermore, (a nihilist could say) there is something 
intellectually very dishonest about intuitionism, for 
what the intuitionists profess to recognizn as moral 
intuitions always turn out to be what the rest of us 
can clearly rocognizc as the influences of upbringing. 
Intuitionists such as Frichard make ranch of the fact 
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that a large part of our moral experience bears little 
resemblance to the weighing and calculating of painful 
versus pleasurable consequences envisaged by utili-
tarianism: e.g., we ordinarily keep our promises and 
pay our debts, not with an eye to the consequences, 
but merely because we fee] it is right to do so. But 
given the nature of our moral upbringing, this is only 
to be expected; we learn our duties more by rote than 
by reason. Where the intuitionist would say "It is 
intuitively obvious to me that John did wrong in 
shooting Helena," the more honest man would say "I 
was brought up to think murder a most heinous crime, 
and my upbringing -worked." The truth of one's 
inherited prejudices is "intuitively obvious" to 
oneself; this is about all that the phrase "intuitively 
obvious" seems to mean, on close inspection, although 
i t purports to mean more • 
Besides intuitionism, there is the attempt to 
establish an analytic connection betweon l:-predicatcs 
and H-prcdicates. "You say he shot her deliberately, 
with premeditation and malice aforethought, and solely 
for motives of gain? But that is just the sort of 
thing we mean by 'murder4; read the legal definition! 
And wc all know that murder is wrong, by definition." 
Then again, there is this more plausible version: 
"good" just means "pleasurable" (or "relatively 
painless"). A right act is an act with good 
consequences; and the consequences of an act arc good 
if they arc more pleasurable or less painful than the 
consequences of any alternative act. The good is 
happiness; and "happiness" means "pleasure, and the 
avoidance of pain." And this of course is the sort 
of thing that G.li. Moore put a stop to long ago: to 
say that "good" just means '^pleasurable" is to commit 
what Moore would call the "Naturalistic Fallacy." 
There are some flaws in this nation of a Naturalistic 
Fallacy; Moore evidently thought the reason it is 
wrong to say that "good" just means "pleasurable"" is 
that "good" cannot he defined in any other terms than 
itself, that "good" names a property which is simple 
and unanalysable, and so good is itsel f (indefinable. 
To give a definition of good in terms of any other 
word or words would he to confuse two distinct 
concepts, e.g.goodness and pleasure. Mow, as one of 
Moore's detractors has pointed out, this kind of 
reasoning would make any definition impossible. It 
is cloar, however, that what Moore is trying to do 
here is to show the impossibility of drawing analytic 
connections between what I have called Ii-predicates 
and M-predicates. When wc have salvaged what is 
worth salvaging of Moore's doctrine, wc will have the 
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foundation both for a rational theory of othics and 
a rationnl doctrine of nihilism. 
Moore states the crux of the salvagable part of 
his doctrine when he says that: 
...propositions about the good are all of then 
synthetic and never analytic.And the same thing 
may be cxpressod more popularly, by saying that, 
if I am right, then nobody can foist upon us 
such an axiom as 'Pleasure is tho only good' 
or that 'The good is the desired' on the 
pretence that this is 'the very meaning of the 
word.'13 
This may he interpreted in part as implying that all 
positive moral assertions which are informative, 
which tell us something about tho world, arc also 
synthetic. This docs not mean, however, that "good" 
cannot be defined. We can have analytic relations 
between moral tonus, between the moral parts of 
speech; what wc cannot have is analytic relations 
between moral and non-moral terms, between E-prcdicatcs 
and M-predicates. When wc consider what we mean 
by "good," it is clear that wc may define it thus: 
"good" -"intrinsically valuable" 
(or, more properly) 
"good" "having, or leading to, 
intrinsic value" 
Wc commit no fallacy if we say thot, by "good,*1 we 
just mean "intrinsically valuable." Moore claims 
that while "good" is indefinable, "the goad* can 
he defined •- and wc would concur with the latter 
claim; thus: 
"the good" "that empirically 
ascertainable property 
to which intrinsic 
value is assigned" 
Thus, when utilitarianism is properly reconstructed, 
what lies at the heart of it is not a definition ("the 
good" "happiness") but an assignment of intrinsic 
value to some entity or quantity x (x OTappIncss: 
''the good, it so happens, is happiness"); this 
assignment of intrinsic value takes the form, not 
of an analytic tnith, but rather of a universal 
synthetic statement which may he cither true or false. 
The sense of '*good" is analytically connected only with 
the concept of intrinsic value, and also with the 
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concents of "Tightness" and "obligation"; thus: 
"right act" "act which maximizes 
tho good" 
•wrong act" "act which minimizes 
the good" 
It is of course an analytic truth that wc ought to 
do right acts, and refrain from wrong ones. And now 
wo see how it is that intelligent men were driven to 
such a grotesque doctrine as intuitionism; for if 
wc cannot be intuitionists, then it appears we must 
admit that wc can have no way of knowing whether our 
particular assignment of intrinsic value is true or 
false, and we are free to assort tho latter and be 
nihilists, if wc choose. Of course, we might always 
turn out to be wrong in having done so, if a 
connection between E-predicates and M-predicates 
ever becomes manifest -- as on tho Judgment Day. 
However, it would be most interesting to sec how even 
Cod could make the connection except bv fiat. The 
point is, there may he such a connection and it may 
lie in something less capricious than divine fiat; 
but if so no one lias as yet succeeded in demonstrating 
it and it is this task that moral philosophers 
should be about, rather than asking themselves such 
straw questions as "Why should I he moral?" The 
nihilist challenge to ethics is more fruitful 
it requires us to give an account of the truth 
conditions of positive moral assertions, and show 
why this accoiutt is better than all other accounts. 
University of Kansas 
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